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In February 2009 the House of Lords Constitutional Committee in the United Kingdom published the report Surveillance: 
Citizens and the State. Some have hailed this as a landmark document. The following is one of four commentaries that the editors 




If it is the thought that counts – and it should count for something – the attempt by the House of Lords and 
other elements of the British Government to focus attention on surveillance issues is a welcome one. 
There is little doubt that surveillance in its various forms is destined to become a central policy issue in the 
digital era, and it is equally clear that some of the ready-to-hand ways of thinking about issues of state 
monitoring, market research, and personal privacy are hopelessly outdated. The recommendation in the 
House of Lords report to, “involve schools, learned and other societies, and voluntary organisations in 
public discussion of the risks and benefits of surveillance and data processing,” should be taken as a 
challenge to rethink surveillance issues in ways that are as broad-ranging and comprehensive as the 
dramatic transformations in surveillance practices we are currently facing. This response to the report 
highlights in particular the importance of rethinking the relationship between private and public sector 
surveillance, of confronting the permeation of social space by market-driven forms of monitoring, and of 
interrogating the simple opposition between freedom and surveillance that characterizes some of the 
report’s formulations.  
 
To its credit, the report repeatedly expresses concern over the failure to grant the Privacy Commissioner’s 
Office the power to monitor private sector compliance with regulations governing the handling of personal 
information. It also acknowledges, in passing, the “growing exchange of personal data between the public 
and private sectors” (58). What bears further exploration, however, is the eroding boundary between 
modes of surveillance – the adoption by both private and public sectors of actuarial models for managing 
risk and data-driven customization systems for providing services. In both cases, surveillance takes on a 
particular meaning: the creation of a comprehensive data portrait of an entire population. No longer is 
there a distinction between surveillance targets and non-targets: the population itself is the target, and each 
member of the population an integral part of the overall picture.      
 
As Professor Clive Norris put it in his comments to the report committee, the switch from targeting 
individuals to monitoring populations, “becomes in a sense expansionary to a huge degree. If you see that 
information is what you need to solve a problem, but you do not quite know what that problem is and you 
do not know what future events you are going to be responding to, the temptation is to collect all 
information about all people” (28). In the petabyte era, this observation can be put even more forcefully: 
collecting information about everyone becomes not just a technological temptation, but an operational 
necessity – a different way of doing surveillance.   
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Invoking the term popularized by Ian Ayres (2007), database forms of monitoring, whether for law 
enforcement, marketing, or providing services, rely on the process of “super-crunching” as much 
information as possible in order to generate robust predictive patterns. In such a context it becomes as 
important to collect information about non-targets as potential targets (of suspicion or services) in order to 
set norms and to unearth new correlations. What is at stake here – in both marketing and law enforcement 
— is a shift to a model in which conventional standards for evaluating targeted surveillance are, in a 
sense, sidelined. As the report puts it, in the era of data-mining and profiling, “the use of personal data in 
data matching and profiling presents challenges to the necessity and proportionality aspects of data 
protection and human rights legislation” (14). For example, the report describes the use of covert 
surveillance, hidden cameras or recording devices to catch litterbugs as a representative case of non-
proportional surveillance.  But, when the model shifts from one based on targeted surveillance to data-
mining, the structure of accountability standards changes. No longer is it a question of whether or not to 
subject a particular individual to a specific monitoring regime. In a database model individual targets 
emerge after the fact as outputs of the surveillance process. Thus, the pertinent decision becomes whether 
or not to use a population-driven database model – and in many cases that choice has already been made.  
 
The standards for regulating surveillance in the database era shift accordingly: we need to consider how 
monitoring systems can be designed in ways that enhance citizen control and facilitate accountability. 
Similarly, the notion of individual or personal autonomy needs to be supplemented by a conception of 
“collective autonomy.”  As a society, what level of customization and targeting are we comfortable with? 
What types of data queries do we want to rule out of bounds? How do we want data sharing processes to 
be structured? How do we avoid the pathologies of discrimination and disempowerment associated with 
the sorting process? To date, the default assumption in both the public and private sectors has been that if 
some customization is good, more is better. This assumption needs to be revisited at the level of public 
policy and public deliberation.  If personal autonomy can be understood as, among other things, entailing 
control over the disclosure of personal information, the process of building regulatory structures that 
secure this autonomy must take place at the collective level. In this regard, the report provides welcome 
recognition that freedom, in a meaningful sense, cannot be secured by aggregating individual “free” 
choices in the marketplace, but must be addressed at the level where market relations are themselves 
structured – that is, at the regulatory level.  
 
In practice, however, the rampant privatization of interactive spaces pushes in the opposite direction. The 
failure to directly address this process is one of the report’s blind spots. What we are facing, in the realms 
of content provision and interpersonal communication, might be described as a virtual version of the 
privatization of social space. If the second half of the 20th century witnessed the increasing privatization of 
physical space, from the process of suburbanization to the replacement of downtown shopping areas by 
shopping malls, the first half of the 21st century continues the trend in virtual space. Applications like 
Facebook, MySpace, and Gmail facilitate the 21st century’s ongoing privatization of the social space of 
communication.  
 
Two intertwined processes are at work in this form of privatization, both of which have implications for 
the critique of a so-called surveillance society. The first is the development of interactive forms of 
monitoring facilitated by networked digitization. To take one example, as e-mail comes to replace the 
Royal Mail for a variety of uses (though certainly not all uses), written correspondence is subjected to 
more comprehensive and exhaustive forms of monitoring, data collection, and storage. Unlike the Royal 
Mail, Gmail can keep copies of the contents of every message sent using its service, and keep detailed 
records of when and where the e-mail service is used, when messages are read, responded to, and 
discarded. In the case of Gmail, the contents of all messages can be mechanically scanned for keywords. 
The move from “snail mail” to email thus represents a quantum leap in the ability to monitor consumer 
behaviour. Since users may be more likely to correspond more frequently and rapidly over email, they 
generate more grist for the data mill. The ease of email, in other words, helps transform written 
communication in ways that accelerate interactions even as they generate more data for monitoring 
systems. The same can be said of other applications that privatize socialization, communication, and 
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information gathering. As the report suggests, however, increasing privatization goes hand-in-hand with 
the de-differentiation of private and public sector forms of monitoring.  The private sector may be taking 
the lead in accumulating demographic, psychographic, geographic, and other forms of transactionally 
generated data, but in so doing it draws the attention of state surveillance systems. As the private sector 
takes on security duties offloaded onto it by the state, and as the state adopts actuarial models of 
surveillance for both law enforcement and service provision, the result is, ‘the growing exchange of 
personal data between the public and private sectors,’ noted in the report (103).  The process is 
exacerbated by the tendency of state agencies, especially in the wake of the September 11 attacks, to view 
commercial databases as treasure troves of raw data for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
 
The privatization of information collection means enhanced surveillance goes hand-in-hand with reduced 
accountability. Thus, the example of the transition from Royal Mail to email also represents a shift from a 
public to a private infrastructure, from one with built in mechanisms for public accountability to one that 
may not even be based in the United Kingdom. At the same time, the example of the shift from Royal 
Mail to email represents a shift from a public to a private infrastructure, from one with built in 
mechanisms for public accountability to one that may not even be based in the United Kingdom. This shift 
is a crucial one the implications of which tend to be both under-reported and under-acknowledged. The 
emerging online commercial model for communication and social networking relies increasingly on 
targeted advertising and thus on accumulating as much information as possible about individual users. The 
shift from a public infrastructure to a private one thus means shifting from a fees- and tax-funded system 
to a commercial model whose ongoing survival depends on increasingly comprehensive surveillance. 
Surveillance is not ancillary to the online business model; it lies at its very core. 
 
The burgeoning popularity of social networking sites replicates this logic: it represents the migration of 
increasingly popular forms of socializing and communication into commercially owned and operated 
network infrastructures. This is not to diminish the new and clearly popular forms of socializing such 
networks make possible. Rather, it is to point out that they represent the galloping privatization of realms 
of social life that were once, for the most part, beyond the monitoring gaze of marketers and the state 
agencies that seek access to private sector databases. It is also to point out that the new frontiers in 
socializing pioneered by social networking sites and other networked forms of socialization take place 
within a commercial model based on the collection of comprehensive data about whom users stay in touch 
with, whom they contact most frequently and how. Such networks make possible the construction of 
comprehensive data portraits of our social lives. They also facilitate the commercial saturation of our 
social interactions. The Royal Mail does not insert targeted advertising appeals in our personal 
correspondence – and it does not track the details of our prose in order to target those ads more 
effectively. Google does.   
 
The commercialization of our interactive infrastructure is not inevitable but contingent.  It is perfectly 
possible to imagine publicly subsidized Internet service providers, social networking sites, and e-mail 
applications; indeed, this was the original model for e-mail communication. Increasingly, however, we are 
living in a world in which the accepted default model for networked forms of interaction is a privatized 
one with profound implication for private sector forms of monitoring. Whereas it once might have seemed 
intrusive or worse to find ourselves turning over the details of our social lives to interested marketers, it is 
now normal practice online, thanks to the naturalization of a mass-customized commercial model for 
online social utilities.  
 
Concerns about the proliferation of monitoring tend to reinforce the apparent opposition between freedom 
on one hand and surveillance on the other – especially when the focus is on the state rather than on the 
private sector (as in the House of Lords report). However terms like “freedom” and “liberty” can be 
slippery ones that, if undefined, function to obscure rather than clarify the discussion. It is perhaps not 
surprising, for example, that the report’s critique of state surveillance (repeatedly described as “scathing” 
in the media coverage), lends itself to appropriation by populist elements on the right as a means of 
whipping up animosity toward the state. Thus, the report’s repeated tendency to posit a simple opposition 
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between liberty and surveillance resonates not only with a patrician distaste for the sordid business of 
snooping, but also with sentiments like those published in the letters section of the Times of London in 
response to the House of Lords’s stated concerns about the coming surveillance society: “We are fortunate 
that the House of Lords (ironically unelected) has the courage to protect the fundamental freedoms we 
enjoy – unlike Gordon Brown and the Labour party, who want to turn out country into a totalitarian 
surveillance state” (The Times 2009: 29).  
 
The implied opposition of freedom (with the forms of privacy that underwrite it) and surveillance 
(alongside the security that serves as its alibi) is a recurring theme in the report and the headlines it 
spawned, including, for example “Ever Increasing Use of Surveillance and Data Collection Risks 
Undermining Fundamental Freedoms,” (States News Service 2009) “Surveillance Undermines Freedoms,” 
(Secure Computing 2009), and, “Lords: Rise of CCTV is Threat to Freedom” (Travis 2009).  
 
The opposition is not only misleading, but paradoxically runs the danger of undermining protective 
controls on rapidly expanding forms of surveillance. Controlling surveillance, perhaps not surprisingly, 
itself relies on forms of monitoring. As David Lyon, among others, has compellingly argued (see, for 
example, Lyon 2007), surveillance has multiple valences in a democratic society – it can surely be used in 
ways that reinforce power imbalances, threaten democratic self-governance and individual autonomy, but, 
as the report notes, it also has an important role to play in allocating resources, protecting citizens, and the 
process of collective self-governance.  Securing individual liberty and personal freedom relies, at least in 
part, on strategies for monitoring threats to their exercise. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that one of the 
report’s recommendations for limiting state and commercial forms of surveillance is increased monitoring 
– not least of private corporations that collect, sort, and analyse personal information collected from 
consumers.  
 
The simplified neo-libertarian equation of state monitoring with authoritarianism plays into the hands of 
those in the privacy sector who would seek to avoid public scrutiny of their information gathering 
practices.  The unexamined assertion of privacy rights can have the perhaps unanticipated effect of 
protecting the commercial sector’s privatization of personal information. Furthermore, the opposition 
between surveillance and freedom licenses the post-9/11 assertion that there is a necessary trade-off 
between the two: that if the public demands more security, it must simultaneously be conceding its 
willingness to give up some of its freedoms. This makes it all too easy for political leaders to justify 
unaccountable surveillance schemes rather than imagining how freedom and security might work hand-in-
hand. Instead of reproducing an outmoded opposition and its attendant pathologies, we would do better to 
ask two questions: what forms of surveillance might help to secure and protect the forms of liberty we 
associate with democratic self-governance, and how might surveillance schemes be implemented in ways 
that accord with democratic values rather than undermining them? The simple equation of surveillance 
with authoritarianism is a way to dodge the challenges posed by these questions and, perhaps more 
disturbingly, conceding that freedom is necessarily in decline as long as risk is on the rise.  
 
The discussion that needs to take place is necessarily a complex and fast-moving one, but a few principles 
seem clear, including the importance of opposing forms of state surveillance that do not have a built-in 
record keeping and disclosure provision (even if disclosure need be delayed for security or other 
purposes).  Thus, for example, measures like the infamous USA Patriot act which enhanced state 
monitoring capacities while exempting them from sunshine laws (that allow citizens and the press access 
to government records), centralize power and subvert democratic forms of accountability. When it comes 
to both state and private sector surveillance the principles of transparency, accountability (even if it is to 
other government agencies), notification when monitoring is taking place, and correction (the ability of 
citizens to see and correct data about themselves), are basic. However, they do not in themselves regulate 
the level of customization and anonymity available to citizens. The emerging private sector model of 
surveillance is driven by the extraction of value (in the form of detailed information for the databases) 
from users – and historical experience dictates that where value is at stake, commercial interests are not 
self-limiting. Left to its own devices the market did not eliminate child labour, limit working hours or set 
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minimum wages. Nor will it set limits to data collection and sorting practices. These limits need to be 
determined collectively and imposed on the owners and operators of the databases. Thus, the report’s call 
to improve, “the independent gathering of public opinion on a range of issues related to surveillance and 
data processing” (92) is a welcome one, as its emphasis on the importance of promoting public knowledge 
about surveillance issues (97). What control over productive resources was to the industrial revolution, 
control over communication and information resources will be to the digital era. Control over personal 
information is the database era analogue of control over labour power in the industrial revolution. 
Information, deliberation, and collective action will have crucial roles to play in what is certain to be an 
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